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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Epistemic blame isn’t relationship modification

Adam Piovarchy

The Philosophical Quarterly · 06.11.2026

DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqag080 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 06.11.2026. Verfasst von Adam Piovarchy. Die Arbeit nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Australian Research Council.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Epistemologists have recently argued that there is such a thing as ‘epistemic blame’: blame targeted at purely epistemic norm violations. Leading the charge has been Cameron Boult, who has argued across a papers and a monograph that we can make sense of this phenomenon by building an account of epistemic blame off of Scanlon’s account of moral blame. This paper argues a relationship-based account of epistemic blame is untenable, because it eliminates any distinction between blameworthy and excused agents. Attempts to overcome this problem cannot succeed because of the important but unrecognized ways his account deviates from Scanlon’s, and because of differences in how our moral and epistemic conduct are affected by our attitudes and expectations.

Förderung

  • Australian Research Council

Zitieren

APA

Piovarchy, A. (2026). Epistemic blame isn’t relationship modification. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqag080

Vancouver

Piovarchy A. Epistemic blame isn’t relationship modification. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2026. doi:10.1093/pq/pqag080

BibTeX
@article{Piovarchy2026,
  author = {Piovarchy, Adam},
  title = {Epistemic blame isn’t relationship modification},
  journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/pq/pqag080}
}
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