Instrumentalism and higher-order defeat
The Philosophical Quarterly · 29.10.2026 · 76 (4) · 1394-1414
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqag061 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 03.09.2026. Verfasst von Miriam Schoenfield. Die Arbeit nennt 44 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Standard accounts of higher-order defeat run into well-known Bayesian hurdles. In this paper, I explore the prospects of overcoming those hurdles by applying a thoroughgoing instrumentalist approach: treating our reasoning capacities as we’d treat any other instrument. I argue that instrumentalism cannot coherently accommodate the defeatist’s position when that position involves genuine higher-order uncertainty—that is, rational uncertainty about what rationality requires. At the end of the paper I gesture at an approach to modeling our responses to defeaters that is both instrumentalist and Bayesian, but that abandons the thought that the cases typically described as cases of higher-order defeat involve genuinely higher-order uncertainty.
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APA
Schoenfield, M. (2026). Instrumentalism and higher-order defeat. The Philosophical Quarterly, 76(4), 1394-1414. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqag061
Vancouver
Schoenfield M. Instrumentalism and higher-order defeat. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2026;76(4):1394-1414. doi:10.1093/pq/pqag061
BibTeX
@article{Schoenfield2026,
author = {Schoenfield, Miriam},
title = {Instrumentalism and higher-order defeat},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2026},
volume = {76},
number = {4},
pages = {1394--1414},
doi = {10.1093/pq/pqag061}
}
EUVIMED