Non-moral blame
The Philosophical Quarterly · 29.07.2026
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqag045 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 29.07.2026. Verfasst von Elizabeth Ventham. Die Arbeit nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A lot of blame is very obviously moral. But what about the cases that aren’t so obvious? I might appear to blame you for your bad art, your prudentially bad actions, or your bad cooking. Some take the view that even though there are genuine non-moral values in the world, there’s no genuine non-moral blame. According to them, the instances above are either cases of moral blame (carefully disguised) or they’re not actually blame at all. This paper argues against that view. Real cases of non-moral blame are common. I make this argument in a number of ways, including by making the case for why moral and non-moral blame are often intertwined, and why that shouldn’t put off our intuitions, and by showing that non-moral blame is structurally similar in every way to moral blame except for the value in question.
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APA
Ventham, E. (2026). Non-moral blame. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqag045
Vancouver
Ventham E. Non-moral blame. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2026. doi:10.1093/pq/pqag045
BibTeX
@article{Ventham2026,
author = {Ventham, Elizabeth},
title = {Non-moral blame},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/pq/pqag045}
}
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