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Evidentialism and the epistemic condition on evidence possession

Kevin Gausselin

The Philosophical Quarterly · 14.07.2026

DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqag037 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 14.07.2026. Verfasst von Kevin Gausselin. Die Arbeit nennt 22 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

An important question for evidentialism is: what does it take to have evidence? Feldman (2004) and McGrath (2018) argue that evidence possession requires more than psychological access—it must also satisfy an epistemic condition, such as being justified. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic condition either results in a problematic regress or denies internalism unless one distinguishes between two senses of evidence possession. Developing this distinction helps to clarify the structure and nature of our evidence. In particular, it shows that one’s evidence, at a fundamental level, is self-supporting and consists of one’s mental states rather than their propositional contents.

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APA

Gausselin, K. (2026). Evidentialism and the epistemic condition on evidence possession. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqag037

Vancouver

Gausselin K. Evidentialism and the epistemic condition on evidence possession. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2026. doi:10.1093/pq/pqag037

BibTeX
@article{Gausselin2026,
  author = {Gausselin, Kevin},
  title = {Evidentialism and the epistemic condition on evidence possession},
  journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/pq/pqag037}
}
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