The Mind that Matters
The Philosophical Quarterly · 26.06.2026
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqag035 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 26.06.2026. Verfasst von Mattia Cecchinato. Die Arbeit nennt 55 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Open Philanthropy Scholarship, St Cross Uehiro Scholarship for Future Generations.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
What kind of mind is necessary and sufficient for moral status—for having interests that matter morally in and of themselves? This paper defends Affective Sentientism, the view that moral status requires the capacity for affective experiences such as pleasure, pain, and emotion. I argue that affective consciousness is what makes an entity a welfare subject, and that all and only welfare subjects have moral status. The connection between affect and welfare is systematic: I show that every major candidate welfare good has an affective component, often because such goods require the capacity to care. I also argue that even if the properties of being phenomenally conscious, being autonomous, or having a neutral level of welfare could come apart from affective consciousness, none of them could ground moral status in its absence. I conclude by exploring the implications for the moral status of animals and artificial intelligence systems.
Förderung
- Open Philanthropy Scholarship
- St Cross Uehiro Scholarship for Future Generations
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APA
Cecchinato, M. (2026). The Mind that Matters. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqag035
Vancouver
Cecchinato M. The Mind that Matters. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2026. doi:10.1093/pq/pqag035
BibTeX
@article{Cecchinato2026,
author = {Cecchinato, Mattia},
title = {The Mind that Matters},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/pq/pqag035}
}
EUVIMED