Abstraction, truth, and free logic
The Philosophical Quarterly · 27.09.2024
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae118 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 27.09.2024. Verfasst von Bahram Assadian. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: UK Research and Innovation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Abstractionism is the view that Fregean abstraction principles underlie our knowledge of the existence of mathematical objects. It is often assumed that the abstractionist proof for the existence of such objects requires ‘negative free logic’ in which all atomic sentences with empty terms are false. I argue that while negative free logic is not indispensably needed for the proof of abstract existence, there is a motivation for it—along broadly Fregean lines. The standard motivation for negative semantics rests on the explanation of truth in terms of reference. This line of reasoning, however, is not available in a context in which the reference of abstract terms must be proved, and not presupposed. I reverse the direction of explanation, thereby offering a novel motivation, Truth Priority, for the use of negative semantics. Some of the implications of Truth Priority for the abstractionist conception of ontology and reference will also be explored.
Förderung
- UK Research and Innovation
Zitieren
APA
Assadian, B. (2024). Abstraction, truth, and free logic. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae118
Vancouver
Assadian B. Abstraction, truth, and free logic. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2024. doi:10.1093/pq/pqae118
BibTeX
@article{Assadian2024,
author = {Assadian, Bahram},
title = {Abstraction, truth, and free logic},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.1093/pq/pqae118}
}
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