When reasons run out
The Philosophical Quarterly · 02.06.2026 · 76 (3) · 1058-1076
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae098 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 27.08.2024. Verfasst von Jason Kay. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 48 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Subjectivists about practical normativity hold that an agent's favouring and disfavouring attitudes give rise to practical reasons. On this view, an agent's normative reason to choose vanilla over chocolate ice cream ultimately turns on facts about what appeals to her rather than facts about what her options are like attitude-independently. Objectivists—who ground reasons in the attitude-independent features of the things we aim at—owe us an explanation of why it is rational to choose what we favour, if not simply because favouring is a source of reasons. My aim in this paper is to supply such a story. The proposal is roughly that when an agent cannot base her choices on her judgements about what she has most reason to do, structural rationality extends to her a license to choose something simply because she favours it, without imbuing favouring with the authority of a normative reason.
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APA
Kay, J. (2026). When reasons run out. The Philosophical Quarterly, 76(3), 1058-1076. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae098
Vancouver
Kay J. When reasons run out. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2026;76(3):1058-1076. doi:10.1093/pq/pqae098
BibTeX
@article{Kay2026,
author = {Kay, Jason},
title = {When reasons run out},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2026},
volume = {76},
number = {3},
pages = {1058--1076},
doi = {10.1093/pq/pqae098}
}
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