The right to privacy and the deep self
The Philosophical Quarterly · 02.06.2026 · 76 (3) · 1138-1159
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae091 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 29.07.2024. Verfasst von Leonhard Menges. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 46 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Austrian Science Fund.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper presents an account of the right to privacy that is inspired by classic control views on this right and recent developments in moral psychology. The core idea is that the right to privacy is the right that others not make personal information about us flow unless this flow is an expression of and does not conflict with our deep self. The nature of the deep self will be spelled out in terms of stable intrinsic desires. The paper argues that this view has advantages over alternative accounts of the right to privacy, that it is extensionally adequate in interesting test cases, that there is a good reason to think that the right to privacy, thus understood, can be justified, and that this view helps identify what kind of information is protected by the right to privacy.
Förderung
- Austrian Science Fund
Zitieren
APA
Menges, L. (2026). The right to privacy and the deep self. The Philosophical Quarterly, 76(3), 1138-1159. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae091
Vancouver
Menges L. The right to privacy and the deep self. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2026;76(3):1138-1159. doi:10.1093/pq/pqae091
BibTeX
@article{Menges2026,
author = {Menges, Leonhard},
title = {The right to privacy and the deep self},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2026},
volume = {76},
number = {3},
pages = {1138--1159},
doi = {10.1093/pq/pqae091}
}
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