Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice
The Philosophical Quarterly · 01.12.2023 · 74 (1) · 229-250
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad024 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 20.03.2023. Verfasst von Martina Fürst. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: University of Graz.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Miranda Fricker’s insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience, and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel, public concept. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament.
Förderung
- University of Graz
Zitieren
APA
Fürst, M. (2023). Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice. The Philosophical Quarterly, 74(1), 229-250. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad024
Vancouver
Fürst M. Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2023;74(1):229-250. doi:10.1093/pq/pqad024
BibTeX
@article{Frst2023,
author = {Fürst, Martina},
title = {Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2023},
volume = {74},
number = {1},
pages = {229--250},
doi = {10.1093/pq/pqad024}
}
EUVIMED