EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

The Dynamics of Electoral Manipulation and Institutional Trust in Democracies: Election Timing, Blatant Fraud, and the Legitimacy of Governance

Masaaki Higashijima iD, Hisashi Kadoya iD, Yuki Yanai iD

Public Opinion Quarterly · 01.08.2024 · 88 (SI) · 472-494

DOI: 10.1093/poq/nfae022 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Public Opinion Quarterly, online erschienen am 11.07.2024. Verfasst von Masaaki Higashijima und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Associate Professor, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: JSPS KAKENHI.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper explores the dynamic relationship between electoral manipulation and popular trust in political institutions. Governments often manipulate election results by resorting to electoral fraud. They also tilt the electoral field by opportunistically deciding when to hold elections, in other words, election timing maneuvering. How do these two different types of electoral manipulation affect citizens’ trust in the government, legislature, and election management bodies (EMBs)? We suggest that although the short-term effects of election timing manipulation are unclear due to its ambiguous nature as an electioneering strategy, substantial electoral margins created by timing maneuvering facilitate smooth decision-making, leading to boosting trust in the government and legislature over the long run. In contrast, as electoral fraud is an unambiguous form of manipulation, it may undermine trust in the government and parliament, although such effects may not last. By combining an original dataset of election timing with existing survey data comprising 335,000 citizens from fifty-eight democratic countries, we find evidence in support of our theoretical expectations.

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Associate Professor, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan.
  • Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan.
  • Associate Professor, School of Economics & Management, Kochi University of Technology, Kochi, Japan; and Research Fellow, Graduate School of Law, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan.

ORCID-Profile: Masaaki Higashijima, Hisashi Kadoya, Yuki Yanai

Förderung

  • JSPS KAKENHI

Zitieren

APA

Higashijima, M., Kadoya, H., & Yanai, Y. (2024). The Dynamics of Electoral Manipulation and Institutional Trust in Democracies: Election Timing, Blatant Fraud, and the Legitimacy of Governance. Public Opinion Quarterly, 88(SI), 472-494. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfae022

Vancouver

Higashijima M, Kadoya H, Yanai Y. The Dynamics of Electoral Manipulation and Institutional Trust in Democracies: Election Timing, Blatant Fraud, and the Legitimacy of Governance. Public Opinion Quarterly. 2024;88(SI):472-494. doi:10.1093/poq/nfae022

BibTeX
@article{Higashijima2024,
  author = {Higashijima, Masaaki and Kadoya, Hisashi and Yanai, Yuki},
  title = {The Dynamics of Electoral Manipulation and Institutional Trust in Democracies: Election Timing, Blatant Fraud, and the Legitimacy of Governance},
  journal = {Public Opinion Quarterly},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {88},
  number = {SI},
  pages = {472--494},
  doi = {10.1093/poq/nfae022}
}
Kostenlos starten →