Developmental asymmetries in equilibrium selection
PNAS Nexus · 30.10.2026 · 5 (11)
DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag370 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PNAS Nexus, online erschienen am 23.10.2026. Verfasst von Pablo Brañas-Garza und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: LoyolaBehLab & Department of Finance, Universidad Loyola Andalucía, Escritor Castilla Aguayo 4, Córdoba 14004, Spain. Die Arbeit nennt 33 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Coordination problems are central to social and economic life and often involve multiple equilibria. Classical theories identify two canonical principles for equilibrium selection: maximizing payoffs and minimizing strategic risk. These principles differ in what they demand of a decision-maker: payoff-based coordination can be reached by recognizing that one equilibrium pays more, whereas risk-based coordination requires reasoning about what happens when coordination fails. Yet little is known about how the use of these principles varies from late childhood to early adulthood. Using a large sample of more than 2,000 participants aged 10 to 20, who played two coordination games and then stated the reason for each choice, we construct measures that pair each choice with a congruent stated reason and document an asymmetry in their age profiles. Payoff-based coordination is already high at the earliest ages studied and shows at most a weak age gradient. In contrast, risk-based coordination shows a modest but consistent increase with age. The difference between the two age gradients is statistically significant; the risk-based gradient also appears within the study using a common protocol across ages and in the risk-dominant choice itself. Cognitive ability shifts the level of both measures but does not alter their age profiles. These findings show that payoff-based and risk-based coordination vary differently with age, while similar observed choices can be accompanied by different stated reasons.
Schlagwörter
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- LoyolaBehLab & Department of Finance, Universidad Loyola Andalucía, Escritor Castilla Aguayo 4, Córdoba 14004, Spain.
- Department of Applied Economics I, Universidad de Sevilla, Av. Ramón y Cajal 1, Sevilla 41018, Spain.
ORCID-Profile: Pablo Brañas-Garza, Diego Jorrat, Pablo Lomas
Förderung
- Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
Zitieren
APA
Brañas-Garza, P., Jorrat, D., & Lomas, P. (2026). Developmental asymmetries in equilibrium selection. PNAS Nexus, 5(11). https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag370
Vancouver
Brañas-Garza P, Jorrat D, Lomas P. Developmental asymmetries in equilibrium selection. PNAS Nexus. 2026;5(11). doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag370
BibTeX
@article{BraasGarza2026,
author = {Brañas-Garza, Pablo and Jorrat, Diego and Lomas, Pablo},
title = {Developmental asymmetries in equilibrium selection},
journal = {PNAS Nexus},
year = {2026},
volume = {5},
number = {11},
doi = {10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag370}
}
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