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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Co-evolution of risk and cooperation in climate policies under wealth inequality

Jorge M Pacheco iD, Francisco C Santos iD

PNAS Nexus · 28.11.2024 · 3 (12)

DOI: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae550 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PNAS Nexus, online erschienen am 09.12.2024. Verfasst von Jorge M Pacheco und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: INESC-ID, IST-Taguspark, 2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, INESC-ID, TAILOR.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Worldwide cooperation is necessary to mitigate the effects of climate change. Many previous investigations employed the so-called collective risk dilemma, where the risk of losing everything whenever a target is not met was fixed from the outset, rendering predictions dependent on snapshot values assumed for this parameter, whose importance was found to be paramount. Here, we couple risk with the overall success of mitigation, investigating the co-evolution of risk and cooperation in a world where countries are partitioned in two different wealth classes, allowing us to further assess the impact of wealth inequality and homophily on the co-evolutionary dynamics. We show that the stochastic dynamics is dominated by a global attractor, typically located in a region of low risk, where most developed countries cooperate most of the time while developing countries cooperate to a lesser extent. This scenario assumes no homophily which, when moderate, can contribute to increase overall cooperation, more so when combined with the presence of a small fraction of developing countries that opt for an unconditional cooperative behavior.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

collective actionenvironmental agreementsevolutionary game theoryglobal warminggovernance of the commons

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • INESC-ID, IST-Taguspark, 2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal.
  • ATP-Group, P-2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal.
  • Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, IST-Taguspark, 2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal.

ORCID-Profile: Jorge M Pacheco, Francisco C Santos

Förderung

  • Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
  • INESC-ID
  • TAILOR
  • EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program

Zitieren

APA

Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2024). Co-evolution of risk and cooperation in climate policies under wealth inequality. PNAS Nexus, 3(12). https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae550

Vancouver

Pacheco JM, Santos FC. Co-evolution of risk and cooperation in climate policies under wealth inequality. PNAS Nexus. 2024;3(12). doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae550

BibTeX
@article{Pacheco2024,
  author = {Pacheco, Jorge M and Santos, Francisco C},
  title = {Co-evolution of risk and cooperation in climate policies under wealth inequality},
  journal = {PNAS Nexus},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {3},
  number = {12},
  doi = {10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae550}
}
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