When scandals fail to reform: media pressure, policy windows, and financial-integrity reform at Westminster
Parliamentary Affairs · 02.07.2026
DOI: 10.1093/pa/gsag028 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Parliamentary Affairs, online erschienen am 02.07.2026. Verfasst von Aleksei Chumakov. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Why do some Westminster financial-integrity and lobbying scandals produce statutory or structural reform while others, despite intense media coverage, do not? This article examines eight scandal episodes between 2009 and 2023 through a structured qualitative comparison. Drawing on Kingdon’s policy-windows framework, it identifies three conditions whose conjunction is consistently associated with statutory reform: sustained thematic media coverage, cross-party consensus, and an available legislative vehicle. The underlying pattern is structural: the cross-party conditions that allow collective statutory repair are also those that scandal politics tends to erode. Sustained media exposure, in this domain, is a weak lever for institutional reform under exclusive cognisance.
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APA
Chumakov, A. (2026). When scandals fail to reform: media pressure, policy windows, and financial-integrity reform at Westminster. Parliamentary Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsag028
Vancouver
Chumakov A. When scandals fail to reform: media pressure, policy windows, and financial-integrity reform at Westminster. Parliamentary Affairs. 2026. doi:10.1093/pa/gsag028
BibTeX
@article{Chumakov2026,
author = {Chumakov, Aleksei},
title = {When scandals fail to reform: media pressure, policy windows, and financial-integrity reform at Westminster},
journal = {Parliamentary Affairs},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/pa/gsag028}
}
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