How Can Constitution Making Disrupt Separation of Powers Structures?
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies · 19.06.2026
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqag020 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, online erschienen am 19.06.2026. Verfasst von Sergio Verdugo. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Constitution making can be weaponised to disrupt separation of powers (SoP) structures, but the connection between the ideas of SoP and constitution making remains under-theorised in the literature. The dominant normative theory of constitution making, the constituent power theory, has neglected this relationship partly by justifying how constitution makers do not need to respect, strengthen or establish a SoP institutional framework due to their ability to channel the unconstrained power of the people. This article argues that exploring the connection between the ideas of SoP and constitution making is a possible and desirable project. It identifies the conditions that can make such a relationship work and shows how constituent assemblies—a type of constitution-making organ—can disrupt SoP. The article proposes an analytical framework to examine those disruptions, focusing on the timing of their operation and identifying their normative implications.
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APA
Verdugo, S. (2026). How Can Constitution Making Disrupt Separation of Powers Structures?. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqag020
Vancouver
Verdugo S. How Can Constitution Making Disrupt Separation of Powers Structures?. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 2026. doi:10.1093/ojls/gqag020
BibTeX
@article{Verdugo2026,
author = {Verdugo, Sergio},
title = {How Can Constitution Making Disrupt Separation of Powers Structures?},
journal = {Oxford Journal of Legal Studies},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/ojls/gqag020}
}
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