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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Authority, the Voluntary, and the Coercion of Belief

Thomas Pink

Oxford Journal of Law and Religion · 24.07.2026

DOI: 10.1093/ojlr/rwag012 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, online erschienen am 24.07.2026. Verfasst von Thomas Pink. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper discusses legal authority and its relation to belief, including religious belief. Modern jurisprudence is dominated by a model of legal authority as coordinative in function, and as directive of the voluntary – of what is subject to the will and to command. Coercive legal direction, the imposition of legal obligations backed by threats of sanction, is of what we can do or refrain from at will, just in response to a command and as a means to avoiding sanction. This coordinative model that ties legal direction to the voluntary goes back to Hobbes. By contrast, the paper argues, pre-modern natural law theory, the legal theory of early modern scholasticism as expounded by writers such as Molina and Suarez, viewed legal authority as educative. Legal authority serves to teach and communicate, concerning the common good. On this educative model of authority, legal directives witness to truth, about that common good and what would damage it.

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APA

Pink, T. (2026). Authority, the Voluntary, and the Coercion of Belief. Oxford Journal of Law and Religion. https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwag012

Vancouver

Pink T. Authority, the Voluntary, and the Coercion of Belief. Oxford Journal of Law and Religion. 2026. doi:10.1093/ojlr/rwag012

BibTeX
@article{Pink2026,
  author = {Pink, Thomas},
  title = {Authority, the Voluntary, and the Coercion of Belief},
  journal = {Oxford Journal of Law and Religion},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/ojlr/rwag012}
}
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