Semi-collusion and innovation: friends or foes?
Oxford Economic Papers · 01.07.2026 · 78 (3) · 915-934
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpag022 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Oxford Economic Papers, online erschienen am 21.07.2026. Verfasst von Debasmita Basak und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 47 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
It is commonly held that firms engaging in collusive activities adversely affect firms’ R&D incentives and social welfare. With a stochastic non-tournament R&D competition, we argue that this pessimistic view does not necessarily hold when firms collude in production but compete in other non-production activities, such as R&D. This phenomenon is known as semi-collusion. Adopting a unified R&D model that encompasses both product and process R&D, we show that if the probability of success in R&D is relatively high (low), semi-collusion may provide higher (lower) innovation incentives compared to a non-cooperative setting when the firms invest in process innovation. The innovation incentives are strictly higher under semi-collusion when the firms invest in product innovation. Additionally, we find that regardless of the type of innovation (process or product R&D), semi-collusion may improve social welfare when the firms compete in prices and the goods are close substitutes.
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APA
Basak, D., & Mukherjee, A. (2026). Semi-collusion and innovation: friends or foes?. Oxford Economic Papers, 78(3), 915-934. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpag022
Vancouver
Basak D, Mukherjee A. Semi-collusion and innovation: friends or foes?. Oxford Economic Papers. 2026;78(3):915-934. doi:10.1093/oep/gpag022
BibTeX
@article{Basak2026,
author = {Basak, Debasmita and Mukherjee, Arijit},
title = {Semi-collusion and innovation: friends or foes?},
journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
year = {2026},
volume = {78},
number = {3},
pages = {915--934},
doi = {10.1093/oep/gpag022}
}
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