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Integrated information theory (IIT) and the testability of the silent neuron predictions

Sergio Ponce de Leon iD, Jeff Yoshimi

Neuroscience of Consciousness · 17.01.2026 · 2026 (1)

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niag037 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Neuroscience of Consciousness, online erschienen am 08.08.2026. Verfasst von Sergio Ponce de Leon und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, United States. Die Arbeit nennt 73 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Integrated information theory (IIT) makes two predictions about the role of inactive neurons in consciousness. According to the silent brain (SB) prediction, rendering all active neurons inactive (“silent”) in the physical substrate of consciousness (the “main complex”) does not eliminate the presence of consciousness, because the neurons are still able to spike. According to the disabled neuron (DN) prediction, rendering a subset of silent neurons in the main complex no longer able to spike (“disabled”) can impact the qualitative character of experiences “nonconventionally” associated with those neurons. Bartlett (2022) argues that these predictions are untestable, because evidence for either prediction would imply that the testing conditions were not met. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of both silent neuron predictions, showing how they can in fact be tested. For the SB case, we clarify how a neural mechanism outside of the main complex can yield the required report of consciousness while maintaining the SB state. For the DN case, we distinguish between two ways of explaining how a neural mechanism could casually interact with the main complex: an IIT-inspired “dispositionalist” explanation, and a more conventional “actualist” explanation. Drawing on the work of Imre Lakatos, we conclude with a discussion of how the distinction between the two explanations sheds light on why it is so difficult to resolve theoretical disputes about consciousness. Despite these difficulties, we provide a framework that can lead to concrete progress for consciousness science.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

IITLakatoscausationconsciousnessfalsifiabilityintegrated information theorymereologysupervenience

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, United States.

ORCID-Profile: Sergio Ponce de Leon

Zitieren

APA

Ponce de Leon, S., & Yoshimi, J. (2026). Integrated information theory (IIT) and the testability of the silent neuron predictions. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2026(1). https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niag037

Vancouver

Ponce de Leon S, Yoshimi J. Integrated information theory (IIT) and the testability of the silent neuron predictions. Neuroscience of Consciousness. 2026;2026(1). doi:10.1093/nc/niag037

BibTeX
@article{PoncedeLeon2026,
  author = {Ponce de Leon, Sergio and Yoshimi, Jeff},
  title = {Integrated information theory (IIT) and the testability of the silent neuron predictions},
  journal = {Neuroscience of Consciousness},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {2026},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.1093/nc/niag037}
}
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