We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic
Neuroscience of Consciousness · 17.01.2026 · 2026 (1)
DOI: 10.1093/nc/niaf034 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Neuroscience of Consciousness, online erschienen am 09.05.2026. Verfasst von Camilo Miguel Signorelli und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Center for Philosophy of AI, University of Copenhagen, Karen Blixens Plads 8, Copenhagen 2300, Denmark. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 148 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: ANID-Fondecyt postdoctoral, FNRS, Carlsberg Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Models of consciousness need to explain both the objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. A model that intends to avoid such reduction is integrated information theory (IIT). In this article, we discuss the explanatory rationale of IIT, its potential inconsistencies and its consequences for the neuroscience of consciousness more broadly. In particular, we identify ambiguities regarding the directionality of the explanation, i.e. important tensions between IIT’s purported ontological and epistemological primacy of experience, and its explanatory aim of accounting for consciousness in physical, operational terms. Across the text, we propose several ways to avoid these issues and eventually complement, enhance or replace the model. The main goal is to motivate clarification among IIT-proponents and inform IIT-opponents on accurate points of contention, without thereby misrepresenting the model. In our final section, we introduce alternative explanatory paths: mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based types of explanations. These novel and sound explanatory strategies may better inspire the next generation of models of consciousness.
Schlagwörter
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Center for Philosophy of AI, University of Copenhagen, Karen Blixens Plads 8, Copenhagen 2300, Denmark.
- Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, 7 Parks Rd, Oxford OX1 3QG, United Kingdom.
- Laboratory of Neurophysiology and Movement Biomechanics, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Route de Lennik 808, CP 640. Building N, 1070 Brussels, Belgium.
- Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, CNRS, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center, 91191 Gif/Yvette, France.
- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Religious Sciences and Philosophy, Temuco Catholic University, Manuel Montt 056, 4810399 Temuco, Araucanía, Chile.
- Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and Humanities, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Alameda 1869, Santiago, Chile.
ORCID-Profile: Camilo Miguel Signorelli, Robert Prentner
Förderung
- ANID-Fondecyt postdoctoral
- FNRS
- Carlsberg Foundation
- Association for Mathematical Consciousness Science
Zitieren
APA
Signorelli, C. M., Cea, I., & Prentner, R. (2026). We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2026(1). https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niaf034
Vancouver
Signorelli CM, Cea I, Prentner R. We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic. Neuroscience of Consciousness. 2026;2026(1). doi:10.1093/nc/niaf034
BibTeX
@article{Signorelli2026,
author = {Signorelli, Camilo Miguel and Cea, Ignacio and Prentner, Robert},
title = {We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic},
journal = {Neuroscience of Consciousness},
year = {2026},
volume = {2026},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1093/nc/niaf034}
}
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