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Relational Equality and the Morality of Harming: Why Consequentialists and Nonconsequentialists Are Climbing Different Mountains

Antti Kauppinen

The Monist · 10.11.2026

DOI: 10.1093/monist/onag036 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Monist, online erschienen am 10.11.2026. Verfasst von Antti Kauppinen. Die Arbeit nennt 25 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Derek Parfit famously argues that the best versions of (rule) consequentialism and nonconsequentialism converge—roughly, that impersonally optimific moral principles are uniquely universally willable and alternatives to them reasonably rejectable. An important part of making this case is arguing that the key nonconsequentialist distinction between harming as a means and harming as a side effect lacks an adequate rationale. Building on work by Frances Kamm and Stephen Darwall, I argue that there is such a rationale in terms of differential impact on relational equality between the victim and the beneficiary. Roughly, because nonconsensually harming A as a means of benefiting B subordinates A’s good to B’s good and harming as a side effect doesn’t do so, A has a stronger reason to reject principles that allow harming as a means. The problem isn’t, e.g., being forced to serve the agent’s goals, but rather being forced to serve others, which isn’t the case when one is harmed as a side effect. The legitimacy of such complaints is grounded in our authority to demand being treated as an equal rather than in the badness of harm. They are thus fundamentally second-personal. The broader lesson is that the fundamental disagreement between moral theories derives from their conception of the sources of reasons, which renders convergence unlikely.

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APA

Kauppinen, A. (2026). Relational Equality and the Morality of Harming: Why Consequentialists and Nonconsequentialists Are Climbing Different Mountains. The Monist. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onag036

Vancouver

Kauppinen A. Relational Equality and the Morality of Harming: Why Consequentialists and Nonconsequentialists Are Climbing Different Mountains. The Monist. 2026. doi:10.1093/monist/onag036

BibTeX
@article{Kauppinen2026,
  author = {Kauppinen, Antti},
  title = {Relational Equality and the Morality of Harming: Why Consequentialists and Nonconsequentialists Are Climbing Different Mountains},
  journal = {The Monist},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/monist/onag036}
}
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