The Rationalist’s Road to Neutral Monism
The Monist · 16.06.2026 · 109 (3) · 308-325
DOI: 10.1093/monist/onag014 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Monist, online erschienen am 30.05.2026. Verfasst von Fatema Amijee. Die Arbeit nennt 11 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is a cornerstone of rationalist metaphysics, yet many of its consequences remain underexplored. I argue that among these underexplored consequences is a striking variety of neutral monism, construed as the thesis that all entities share the same fundamental modal base. My argument proceeds in three stages. First, I motivate a commitment to attributes, metaphysically necessary properties that ultimately explain an entity’s modal profile. Second, I argue that the PSR supports the claim that every entity must instantiate every attribute. Third, I draw out the metaphysical implications of this conclusion: I show that it rules out substance dualism, versions of reductive and nonreductive physicalism, and idealism in favour of a neutral monist ontology.
Zitieren
APA
Amijee, F. (2026). The Rationalist’s Road to Neutral Monism. The Monist, 109(3), 308-325. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onag014
Vancouver
Amijee F. The Rationalist’s Road to Neutral Monism. The Monist. 2026;109(3):308-325. doi:10.1093/monist/onag014
BibTeX
@article{Amijee2026,
author = {Amijee, Fatema},
title = {The Rationalist’s Road to Neutral Monism},
journal = {The Monist},
year = {2026},
volume = {109},
number = {3},
pages = {308--325},
doi = {10.1093/monist/onag014}
}
EUVIMED