x Is Essentially F
The Monist · 16.06.2026 · 109 (3) · 267-275
DOI: 10.1093/monist/onag011 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Monist, online erschienen am 30.05.2026. Verfasst von Anna Marmodoro. Die Arbeit nennt 6 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper I argue against the view that essences are related to the things that have them as properties those things cannot lose without losing their identity. If things have their essences, regresses develop and unravel the ontology. Both Modal Essentialism and Kit Fine’s Definitional Essentialism are open to such regresses. By contrast, I advocate a type of essentialism according to which things do not have essences and are not qualified by their essences, but rather, they are constituted by their essences.
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APA
Marmodoro, A. (2026). x Is Essentially F. The Monist, 109(3), 267-275. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onag011
Vancouver
Marmodoro A. x Is Essentially F. The Monist. 2026;109(3):267-275. doi:10.1093/monist/onag011
BibTeX
@article{Marmodoro2026,
author = {Marmodoro, Anna},
title = {x Is Essentially F},
journal = {The Monist},
year = {2026},
volume = {109},
number = {3},
pages = {267--275},
doi = {10.1093/monist/onag011}
}
EUVIMED