We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes
Mind · 01.01.2020 · 129 (513) · 225-234
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzy054 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mind, online erschienen am 25.10.2018. Verfasst von David Faraci. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 1 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best explained by differences between actions and affective attitudes, not between kinds of normative support. In closing, I argue that even if Maguire were correct, the extent of the threat to one of his central targets—so-called ‘buck-passing’ views—would remain unclear.
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APA
Faraci, D. (2020). We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes. Mind, 129(513), 225-234. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy054
Vancouver
Faraci D. We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes. Mind. 2020;129(513):225-234. doi:10.1093/mind/fzy054
BibTeX
@article{Faraci2020,
author = {Faraci, David},
title = {We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes},
journal = {Mind},
year = {2020},
volume = {129},
number = {513},
pages = {225--234},
doi = {10.1093/mind/fzy054}
}
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