Could All Rules Have Goals?
Mind · 10.11.2026
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzag056 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mind, online erschienen am 10.11.2026. Verfasst von Pablo Zendejas Medina. Die Arbeit nennt 71 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I argue that not all belief-relative normative principles can be represented as requiring the maximization of expected utility. The argument imposes no limits on the distinctions that utility functions can draw, but relies instead on a connection between decision-theoretic representability and uncertainty about one’s own beliefs. By contrast, I argue that evidence-relative normative principles, which say what to do given what would be rational to believe, always admit of such a representation, so long as uncertainty about epistemic rationality is limited in independently plausible ways.
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APA
Medina, P. Z. (2026). Could All Rules Have Goals?. Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzag056
Vancouver
Medina PZ. Could All Rules Have Goals?. Mind. 2026. doi:10.1093/mind/fzag056
BibTeX
@article{Medina2026,
author = {Medina, Pablo Zendejas},
title = {Could All Rules Have Goals?},
journal = {Mind},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/mind/fzag056}
}
EUVIMED