Four Formal Versions of the Two-Envelope Paradox
Mind · 07.05.2026
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzag014 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mind, online erschienen am 07.05.2026. Verfasst von Lennart B Ackermans. Die Arbeit nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Philosophical discussion of the two-envelope paradox has suffered from a lack of formal precision. I discuss various versions of the paradoxical argument using formal probability theory, which helps to make diagnoses that are simpler, more insightful, and provably correct. Paradoxical arguments are revealed to be fallacious for one of three reasons: (1) the argument makes a formal mistake such as an equivocation fallacy; (2) the argument disregards relevant uncertainty about or variability in a unit of measurement; (3) the argument uses an invalid decision rule. I improve upon various existing diagnoses and discuss what kind of philosophical and decision-theoretic import the paradox has.
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APA
Ackermans, L. B. (2026). Four Formal Versions of the Two-Envelope Paradox. Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzag014
Vancouver
Ackermans LB. Four Formal Versions of the Two-Envelope Paradox. Mind. 2026. doi:10.1093/mind/fzag014
BibTeX
@article{Ackermans2026,
author = {Ackermans, Lennart B},
title = {Four Formal Versions of the Two-Envelope Paradox},
journal = {Mind},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/mind/fzag014}
}
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