Explanationism versus Modalism in Debunking (and Theory Choice)
Mind · 23.11.2023 · 132 (528) · 1005-1027
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzad029 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mind, online erschienen am 09.08.2023. Verfasst von Harjit Bhogal. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 46 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
At the core of the recent debate over moral debunking arguments is a disagreement between explanationist and modalist approaches. Explanationists think that the lack of an explanatory connection between our moral beliefs and the moral truths, given a non-naturalist realist conception of morality, is a reason to reject non-naturalism. Modalists disagree. They say that, given non-naturalism, our beliefs have the appropriate modal features with respect to truth – in particular they are safe and sensitive – so there is no problem. There is a stand-off here. I argue, though, that by looking at the role explanatory and modal factors have to play in theory choice more generally, and, in particular, by considering the practice of theory choice in science, we can see that the explanationist is right. The lack of an explanatory connection between our moral beliefs and the moral truths is a reason to reject non-naturalist realism about morality.
Zitieren
APA
Bhogal, H. (2023). Explanationism versus Modalism in Debunking (and Theory Choice). Mind, 132(528), 1005-1027. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad029
Vancouver
Bhogal H. Explanationism versus Modalism in Debunking (and Theory Choice). Mind. 2023;132(528):1005-1027. doi:10.1093/mind/fzad029
BibTeX
@article{Bhogal2023,
author = {Bhogal, Harjit},
title = {Explanationism versus Modalism in Debunking (and Theory Choice)},
journal = {Mind},
year = {2023},
volume = {132},
number = {528},
pages = {1005--1027},
doi = {10.1093/mind/fzad029}
}
EUVIMED