What Would a Phenomenology of Logic Look Like?
Mind · 01.10.2020 · 129 (516) · 1009-1031
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzaa031 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mind, online erschienen am 02.09.2020. Verfasst von James Kinkaid. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 41 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The phenomenological movement begins in the Prolegomena to Husserl’s Logical Investigations as a philosophy of logic. Despite this, remarkably little attention has been paid to Husserl’s arguments in the Prolegomena in the contemporary philosophy of logic. In particular, the literature spawned by Gilbert Harman’s work on the normative status of logic is almost silent on Husserl’s contribution to this topic. I begin by raising a worry for Husserl’s conception of ‘pure logic’ similar to Harman’s challenge to explain the connection between logic and reasoning. If logic is the study of the forms of all possible theories, it will include the study of many logical consequence relations; by what criteria, then, should we select one (or a distinguished few) consequence relation(s) as correct? I consider how Husserl might respond to this worry by looking to his late account of the ‘genealogy of logic’ in connection with Gurwitsch’s claim that ‘[i]t is to prepredicative perceptual experience … that one must return for a radical clarification and for the definitive justification of logic’. Drawing also on Sartre and Heidegger, I consider how prepredicative experience might constrain or guide our selection of a logical consequence relation and our understanding of connectives like implication and negation.
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APA
Kinkaid, J. (2020). What Would a Phenomenology of Logic Look Like?. Mind, 129(516), 1009-1031. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa031
Vancouver
Kinkaid J. What Would a Phenomenology of Logic Look Like?. Mind. 2020;129(516):1009-1031. doi:10.1093/mind/fzaa031
BibTeX
@article{Kinkaid2020,
author = {Kinkaid, James},
title = {What Would a Phenomenology of Logic Look Like?},
journal = {Mind},
year = {2020},
volume = {129},
number = {516},
pages = {1009--1031},
doi = {10.1093/mind/fzaa031}
}
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