The question of the animal in warfare
London Review of International Law · 07.08.2026
DOI: 10.1093/lril/lrag011 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift London Review of International Law, online erschienen am 07.08.2026. Verfasst von Katy Sower. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article engages with scholarship on the animal in warfare, with its focus on the inclusion of non-human animals in international humanitarian law (IHL). Drawing upon posthuman feminist theory, it offers a critical reading of how legal ‘orderings’ work in IHL and warfare in relation to the animal. It is argued that the construction of distinctions to determine those ‘worthy of protection’ is inherent in the historical development and contemporary practice of IHL. Animals intentionally fall outside of the category of those deemed worthy of protection, since IHL protects some idealised form of ‘humanity,’ which is set apart from ‘animality’. For example, the original commentaries on the Geneva Convention III explain that protection is afforded to prisoners of war so as not to reduce humans ‘to the level of animals’. This ‘humanity/animality’ distinction is evidenced in contemporary political practice, with so-called legitimate targets of attack in Gaza including ‘inhuman animals’.
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APA
Sower, K. (2026). The question of the animal in warfare. London Review of International Law. https://doi.org/10.1093/lril/lrag011
Vancouver
Sower K. The question of the animal in warfare. London Review of International Law. 2026. doi:10.1093/lril/lrag011
BibTeX
@article{Sower2026,
author = {Sower, Katy},
title = {The question of the animal in warfare},
journal = {London Review of International Law},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/lril/lrag011}
}
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