Economic Principles for the Enforcement of Abuse of Dominance Provisions
Journal of Competition Law & Economics · 14.06.2024 · 20 (1-2) · 85-107
DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhae003 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Competition Law & Economics, online erschienen am 19.03.2024. Verfasst von Chiara Fumagalli und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The European Commission (EC) has recently announced its intention to issue Guidelines on exclusionary abuses. In this paper, we explain how economics can and should be used to inform a sound and effects-based approach in the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU. In particular, the EC should be guided only by a consumer welfare standard; exclusive dealing and exclusivity rebates should be subject to a (rebuttable) presumption of harm; price–cost tests are meaningful only for predation and other practices that do not reference rivals; essentiality of the input should not be a requirement for vertical foreclosure cases of any type, but such cases should be limited only to dominant firms that satisfy certain criteria.
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APA
Fumagalli, C., & Motta, M. (2024). Economic Principles for the Enforcement of Abuse of Dominance Provisions. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 20(1-2), 85-107. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhae003
Vancouver
Fumagalli C, Motta M. Economic Principles for the Enforcement of Abuse of Dominance Provisions. Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 2024;20(1-2):85-107. doi:10.1093/joclec/nhae003
BibTeX
@article{Fumagalli2024,
author = {Fumagalli, Chiara and Motta, Massimo},
title = {Economic Principles for the Enforcement of Abuse of Dominance Provisions},
journal = {Journal of Competition Law & Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {20},
number = {1-2},
pages = {85--107},
doi = {10.1093/joclec/nhae003}
}
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