International Judicial Cooperation in Game Theory
Journal of International Dispute Settlement · 2021
DOI: 10.1093/jnlids/idaa017 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2021. Verfasst von Zheng Tang. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article utilizes the game theory to assess the feasibility and weaknesses of different methods to promote international judicial cooperation. It starts by justifying the game theory as a proper model to understand the pattern of interaction between states. It then applies typical games to analyse states’ decision-making process. It suggests that states should not update their domestic laws to unilaterally offer judicial cooperation to other countries even if reciprocity is adopted to urge other states to cooperate. The only effective means is through an international judicial cooperation treaty, which encounters relatively small compliance and enforcement problems. The first-mover disadvantage at the ratification stage is not a fundamental barrier and may disappear over time. The battle-of-the-sexes game at the negotiation stage can be mitigated through the facilitation of a reputable institute, increasing cooperation interests and needs and reducing cooperation standards.
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APA
Tang, Z. (2021). International Judicial Cooperation in Game Theory. Journal of International Dispute Settlement. https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idaa017
Vancouver
Tang Z. International Judicial Cooperation in Game Theory. Journal of International Dispute Settlement. 2021. doi:10.1093/jnlids/idaa017
BibTeX
@article{Tang2021,
author = {Tang, Zheng},
title = {International Judicial Cooperation in Game Theory},
journal = {Journal of International Dispute Settlement},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1093/jnlids/idaa017}
}
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