Price Delegation and Performance Pay: Evidence from Industrial Sales Forces
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · 2016-08 · 32 (3) · 508-544
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/eww003 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, online erschienen am 31.03.2016. Verfasst von Desmond (Ho-Fu) Lo und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 43-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 57 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
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APA
Lo, D. H., Dessein, W., Ghosh, M., & Lafontaine, F. (2016). Price Delegation and Performance Pay: Evidence from Industrial Sales Forces. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 32(3), 508-544. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/eww003
Vancouver
Lo DH, Dessein W, Ghosh M, Lafontaine F. Price Delegation and Performance Pay: Evidence from Industrial Sales Forces. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2016;32(3):508-544. doi:10.1093/jleo/eww003
BibTeX
@article{Lo2016,
author = {Lo, Desmond (Ho-Fu) and Dessein, Wouter and Ghosh, Mrinal and Lafontaine, Francine},
title = {Price Delegation and Performance Pay: Evidence from Industrial Sales Forces},
journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
year = {2016},
volume = {32},
number = {3},
pages = {508--544},
doi = {10.1093/jleo/eww003}
}
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