Platform liability rules: strict liability versus negligence
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · 05.11.2026
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewag037 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, online erschienen am 05.11.2026. Verfasst von Xinyu Hua und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Hong Kong Research Grants Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper explores whether platform liability should be strict or negligence-based. Platforms generate revenue by selling products or services to consumers and offering access to consumer data or attention to third parties. There are cross-side network effects: higher consumer participation increases third-party surplus (a positive externality) but magnifies social harm (a negative externality). Both rules motivate platforms to take socially efficient precautions, yet they have differing impacts on consumer participation and social welfare. If network benefits are weak (strong), the price charged to consumers is positive (zero). With intermediate network benefits, negligence can generate more consumer participation and higher social welfare by balancing positive and negative externalities. With large network benefits and zero price, strict liability increases participation by compensating harmed consumers and proves superior to negligence. Overall, the welfare implications of platform liability depend crucially on the strength of network effects and the nature of externalities.
Förderung
- Hong Kong Research Grants Council
Zitieren
APA
Hua, X., & Spier, K. E. (2026). Platform liability rules: strict liability versus negligence. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag037
Vancouver
Hua X, Spier KE. Platform liability rules: strict liability versus negligence. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2026. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewag037
BibTeX
@article{Hua2026,
author = {Hua, Xinyu and Spier, Kathryn E},
title = {Platform liability rules: strict liability versus negligence},
journal = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewag037}
}
EUVIMED