Can’t buy me love? Cash transfers and support for an autocrat†
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · 02.11.2026
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewag024 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, online erschienen am 02.11.2026. Verfasst von Nikita Zakharov und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 89 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Autocrats often rely on popularity to legitimize their rule. Can they boost this popularity by distributing cash? We address this question using a quasi-experimental setting in Russia in 2020, where the unexpected onset of the pandemic prompted the postponement of a national referendum enabling President Putin’s re-election and the introduction of unconditional cash transfers to families with children. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare political support between transfer recipients and similar non-recipients before and after its introduction. We find that receiving cash transfers substantially increased approval of the autocrat and support for extending his presidential terms, but this effect dissipated within 4 months. A falsification test on the 2018 election confirms that pro-family rhetoric alone, without cash, fails to mobilize comparable support. Robustness tests rule out alternative explanations related to the pandemic. We provide novel evidence that autocrats can strategically use transfers to temporarily boost popularity and consolidate legitimacy.
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APA
Zakharov, N., & Zarbailova, D. (2026). Can’t buy me love? Cash transfers and support for an autocrat†. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag024
Vancouver
Zakharov N, Zarbailova D. Can’t buy me love? Cash transfers and support for an autocrat†. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2026. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewag024
BibTeX
@article{Zakharov2026,
author = {Zakharov, Nikita and Zarbailova, Diana},
title = {Can’t buy me love? Cash transfers and support for an autocrat†},
journal = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewag024}
}
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