Information acquisition and liability for unknowable risk
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · 06.08.2026
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewag018 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, online erschienen am 06.08.2026. Verfasst von Frances Xu Lee. Die Arbeit nennt 23 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Some product harm is exogenously unknowable until after some consumers have suffered the harm. There is a legal debate over whether such unknowable harm to these early consumers should be given immunity. This article finds that when the seller bears strict liability with compensatory damage on the unknowable harm, the seller’s incentive is distorted. There is an incentive to secretly over-test the product, so the seller can drop or attempt to fix a harmful product to reduce the public’s detection. At the same time, there is also an incentive to under-test the product to avoid a negative test result being leaked out by a whistle-blower. To achieve the socially optimal outcome under strict liability, the damages on the unknowable harm must be punitive and tailored to the events. Granting immunity for unknowable harm can remove inefficiency without complicated damages. (JEL K13, D83).
Zitieren
APA
Lee, F. X. (2026). Information acquisition and liability for unknowable risk. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag018
Vancouver
Lee FX. Information acquisition and liability for unknowable risk. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2026. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewag018
BibTeX
@article{Lee2026,
author = {Lee, Frances Xu},
title = {Information acquisition and liability for unknowable risk},
journal = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewag018}
}
EUVIMED