State ownership biases government support—evidence from the financial crisis
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · 08.03.2026
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewag013 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, online erschienen am 08.03.2026. Verfasst von Klaus M Schmidt und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC-TRR 190.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Do governments treat firms they own more generously than comparable firms they do not own? The allocation of stimulus funds to hospitals in Germany during the financial crisis provides a unique opportunity to address this question. Using an instrumental variable approach leveraging the historical persistence of hospital ownership, we find evidence that publicly owned hospitals received substantial preferential treatment from the government. These findings have important implications for industrial policy, providing an explanation for the existence of soft budget constraints often associated with publicly owned enterprises (JEL I18, L33, L53)
Förderung
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC-TRR 190
Zitieren
APA
Schmidt, K. M., Tafti, E. A., & Mang, C. (2026). State ownership biases government support—evidence from the financial crisis. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag013
Vancouver
Schmidt KM, Tafti EA, Mang C. State ownership biases government support—evidence from the financial crisis. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2026. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewag013
BibTeX
@article{Schmidt2026,
author = {Schmidt, Klaus M and Tafti, Elena Ashtari and Mang, Clarissa},
title = {State ownership biases government support—evidence from the financial crisis},
journal = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewag013}
}
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