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Product liability and firm owners’ delegation to overconfident managers

Tim Friehe, Cat Lam Pham

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · 01.11.2024 · 40 (3) · 648-672

DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad007 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, online erschienen am 19.05.2023. Verfasst von Tim Friehe und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 70 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This article analyzes the socially optimal liability allocation when strictly liable Cournot firms delegate their safety and output choices to managers whose potential biases are chosen by firm owners and consumers misperceive product risks. Firm owners always hire managers who are overconfident about their product safety’s effectiveness in reducing product-related accident risk. However, the extent of overconfidence depends on consumers’ risk perceptions and the allocation of liability. As a result, the socially optimal liability allocation hinges on whether consumers underestimate or overestimate product risk. When consumers overestimate product risks, firms should be held liable for all losses incurred by consumers. However, when consumers underestimate risk, firms should only be held liable for a part of consumer losses. We also show that, in some circumstances, negligence produces socially more desirable outcomes than strict liability (JEL: K13, L13, L14).

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APA

Friehe, T., & Pham, C. L. (2024). Product liability and firm owners’ delegation to overconfident managers. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 40(3), 648-672. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad007

Vancouver

Friehe T, Pham CL. Product liability and firm owners’ delegation to overconfident managers. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2024;40(3):648-672. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewad007

BibTeX
@article{Friehe2024,
  author = {Friehe, Tim and Pham, Cat Lam},
  title = {Product liability and firm owners’ delegation to overconfident managers},
  journal = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {40},
  number = {3},
  pages = {648--672},
  doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewad007}
}
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