Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · 12.10.2022 · 38 (3) · 774-839
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewab015 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, online erschienen am 25.10.2021. Verfasst von Marco Di Cataldo und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 61-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 61 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
What is the impact of collusion between members of criminal organizations and politicians on local public finances, in contexts in which organized crime is well-rooted? This article addresses this question by focusing on local governments of Southern Italy, over the period 1998–2016. In order to capture the presence of organized crime, we exploit the enforcement of a national law allowing the dissolution of a municipal government upon evidence of collusion between elected officials and the mafia. We measure the consequences of this infiltration of mafia groups within local governments by using data on local public finances at the municipality level. Difference-in-differences estimates reveal that captured municipalities commit on average more resources for investments in construction and waste management and are less effective in collecting taxes for waste and garbage. This indicates that organized crime groups exploit the collusion with local politicians in order to distort the allocation of public resources toward key sectors of strategic interest for the criminal business (JEL K42, H72, D72).
Zitieren
APA
Cataldo, M. D., & Mastrorocco, N. (2022). Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 38(3), 774-839. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab015
Vancouver
Cataldo MD, Mastrorocco N. Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2022;38(3):774-839. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewab015
BibTeX
@article{Cataldo2022,
author = {Cataldo, Marco Di and Mastrorocco, Nicola},
title = {Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources},
journal = {The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization},
year = {2022},
volume = {38},
number = {3},
pages = {774--839},
doi = {10.1093/jleo/ewab015}
}
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