Marginal Benefits of the Core Securities Laws
Journal of Financial Regulation · 2021
DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjab008 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Financial Regulation, 2021. Verfasst von Kevin S Haeberle. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
To every thing there is a season. In the area of securities regulation in the United States, it is the season for expansion. This article shows why such expansion should not involve use of the core issuer disclosure, fraud, and insider trading laws to reduce information asymmetry in the stock market in the name of investor protection. I argue that any expansion of these laws focused on this secondary market should therefore be justified by distinct concerns (namely, efficiency ones). Moreover, any push to better serve and protect investors should be focused on other areas of securities law (such as those relating to the structure of securities markets) or other markets (such as the market for investment management).
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APA
Haeberle, K. S. (2021). Marginal Benefits of the Core Securities Laws. Journal of Financial Regulation. https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjab008
Vancouver
Haeberle KS. Marginal Benefits of the Core Securities Laws. Journal of Financial Regulation. 2021. doi:10.1093/jfr/fjab008
BibTeX
@article{Haeberle2021,
author = {Haeberle, Kevin S},
title = {Marginal Benefits of the Core Securities Laws},
journal = {Journal of Financial Regulation},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1093/jfr/fjab008}
}
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