The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences
Journal of the European Economic Association · 20.05.2026
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvag028 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the European Economic Association, online erschienen am 20.05.2026. Verfasst von Fausto Panunzi und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: ERC, CEPR, ECGI.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies electoral competition over redistributive taxation between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent. With reference-dependent preferences, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are attracted by the more risky candidate. We show that the equilibrium can display policy divergence: the intrinsically more risky candidate proposes lower taxes and is supported by a coalition of very rich and very disappointed voters, while the safe candidate proposes higher taxes. This can explain why right-wing populist parties are often supported by economically dissatisfied voters and yet they run on policy platforms of low redistribution.
Förderung
- ERC
- CEPR
- ECGI
- IFS
- CESIfo
Zitieren
APA
Panunzi, F., Pavoni, N., & Tabellini, G. (2026). The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvag028
Vancouver
Panunzi F, Pavoni N, Tabellini G. The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2026. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvag028
BibTeX
@article{Panunzi2026,
author = {Panunzi, Fausto and Pavoni, Nicola and Tabellini, Guido},
title = {The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvag028}
}
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