EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Noisy Foresight

Anujit Chakraborty, Chad Kendall

Journal of the European Economic Association · 16.03.2026

DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvag013 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the European Economic Association, online erschienen am 16.03.2026. Verfasst von Anujit Chakraborty und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 60 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: UCD.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitieren

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In a controlled experiment, we show that decision-makers in a one-player, dynamic setting often fail to think through their own future actions before making initial decisions. This failure to plan at future contingencies implies a lack of perfect foresight, violating a fundamental assumption in dynamic decision problems. We show that neither experience nor prompting subjects to think about their future actions improve behavior. Instead the problem stems from failing to think through how future actions translate to optimal actions in the first period. We then turn to the question of how to model the foresight of such boundedly rational agents. Using the rich dataset we collect, across the five behavioral models we consider, we find that a model in which subjects expect to make less mistakes when the utility consequences of their future actions are more disparate best fits behavior.

Förderung

  • UCD

Zitieren

APA

Chakraborty, A., & Kendall, C. (2026). Noisy Foresight. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvag013

Vancouver

Chakraborty A, Kendall C. Noisy Foresight. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2026. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvag013

BibTeX
@article{Chakraborty2026,
  author = {Chakraborty, Anujit and Kendall, Chad},
  title = {Noisy Foresight},
  journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvag013}
}
Kostenlos starten →