Market Power and Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets
Journal of the European Economic Association · 02.04.2026
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvag010 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the European Economic Association, online erschienen am 02.04.2026. Verfasst von Klaus Gugler und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 39 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We exploit the regulatory environment in the Austrian pharmaceutical market to study the effects of price regulation on market outcomes and consumer welfare. We find that product acquisitions of drug producers have a differential impact in regulated and unregulated market segments. Regression results show that M&A increase prices where regulation is absent. While variety decreases in both segments, the effects are smaller under regulation. Counterfactual simulations confirm binding price constraints and show that mergers caused modest consumer surplus losses in unregulated segments, while welfare remained unchanged in regulated ones. Thus, regulation can successfully mitigate the effects of market power.
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APA
Gugler, K., Pirnbacher, L., & Szücs, F. (2026). Market Power and Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvag010
Vancouver
Gugler K, Pirnbacher L, Szücs F. Market Power and Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2026. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvag010
BibTeX
@article{Gugler2026,
author = {Gugler, Klaus and Pirnbacher, Lukas and Szücs, Florian},
title = {Market Power and Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvag010}
}
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