The Common Good and Voter Polarization
Journal of the European Economic Association · 05.08.2026 · 24 (4) · 1554-1586
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvaf059 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the European Economic Association, online erschienen am 13.12.2025. Verfasst von Chad Kendall und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 56 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Do voters see democracy entirely in spatial terms, as a tradeoff of conflicting interests, or do they also view it as a search for the “common good”, as some democracy theorists have long conjectured? We develop a model in which voters have preferences over both common-good and spatial payoffs, and provide a novel method to disentangle the two. Estimating the model on California ballot propositions from 1986 to 2020, we find that 74% of voters placed significant weight on the common good and that partisan polarization roughly doubled over the time period, mainly due to Democrats drifting left.
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APA
Kendall, C., & Matsusaka, J. G. (2026). The Common Good and Voter Polarization. Journal of the European Economic Association, 24(4), 1554-1586. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaf059
Vancouver
Kendall C, Matsusaka JG. The Common Good and Voter Polarization. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2026;24(4):1554-1586. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvaf059
BibTeX
@article{Kendall2026,
author = {Kendall, Chad and Matsusaka, John G},
title = {The Common Good and Voter Polarization},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
year = {2026},
volume = {24},
number = {4},
pages = {1554--1586},
doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvaf059}
}
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