The Incentive Complementarity Between Formal and Informal Enforcement
Journal of the European Economic Association · 09.10.2024 · 22 (5) · 2294-2328
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvae009 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the European Economic Association, online erschienen am 10.02.2024. Verfasst von Matthew O Jackson und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 66 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Science Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We introduce a model in which people exchange some goods and services informally in their community and others formally on a market. We show that enforcement by informal communities and a formal market are complements: If communities ostracize individuals who are caught cheating on the market, this bolsters incentives to comply with exchanges in both settings. Although transactions within a community generate lower gains from trade than those on the wider market, the enhanced incentives from simultaneously transacting in communities and on the overall market can be welfare-enhancing compared with either extreme. We discuss the implications of informal community exchanges in a country’s development as well as how moral or religious beliefs enhance the complementarity between community and formal enforcement.
Förderung
- National Science Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Jackson, M. O., & Xing, Y. (2024). The Incentive Complementarity Between Formal and Informal Enforcement. Journal of the European Economic Association, 22(5), 2294-2328. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae009
Vancouver
Jackson MO, Xing Y. The Incentive Complementarity Between Formal and Informal Enforcement. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2024;22(5):2294-2328. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvae009
BibTeX
@article{Jackson2024,
author = {Jackson, Matthew O and Xing, Yiqing},
title = {The Incentive Complementarity Between Formal and Informal Enforcement},
journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
year = {2024},
volume = {22},
number = {5},
pages = {2294--2328},
doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvae009}
}
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