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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Discretion and Favoritism in Public Procurement

Ferenc Szucs

Journal of the European Economic Association · 09.02.2024 · 22 (1) · 117-160

DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvad017 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the European Economic Association, online erschienen am 07.03.2023. Verfasst von Ferenc Szucs. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 46-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: European Research Council, European Commission.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper investigates the consequences of bureaucratic discretion in public procurement. I exploit a Hungarian policy reform, which allows a “high-discretion” procedure below a certain contract value. At the threshold, I document large discontinuities both in procurement outcomes and in the density of contract values, which indicates that buyers manipulate contract values to avoid auctions. I combine the reform and a structural model to find that discretion increases prices and results in the selection of less productive contractors. I also show that high discretion benefits firms with connections to the party of the central government. I use the structural model to document that public buyers are willing to sacrifice more contract value to increase their discretion if more connected firms are operating in the market. I also use the model to simulate the effects of counterfactual procurement thresholds on different procurement outcomes.

Förderung

  • European Research Council
  • European Commission

Zitieren

APA

Szucs, F. (2024). Discretion and Favoritism in Public Procurement. Journal of the European Economic Association, 22(1), 117-160. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad017

Vancouver

Szucs F. Discretion and Favoritism in Public Procurement. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2024;22(1):117-160. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvad017

BibTeX
@article{Szucs2024,
  author = {Szucs, Ferenc},
  title = {Discretion and Favoritism in Public Procurement},
  journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {22},
  number = {1},
  pages = {117--160},
  doi = {10.1093/jeea/jvad017}
}
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