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Invisible deterrence in merger policy: why the prohibition rate says little

Selcukhan Unekbas, Bowman Heiden, Frederic Jenny, Nicolas Petit, David Bosco

Journal of European Competition Law & Practice · 03.07.2026 · 17 (1) · 1-2

DOI: 10.1093/jeclap/lpag031 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, online erschienen am 20.05.2026. Verfasst von Selcukhan Unekbas und 4 weiteren Autor:innen.

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APA

Unekbas, S., Heiden, B., Jenny, F., Petit, N., & Bosco, D. (2026). Invisible deterrence in merger policy: why the prohibition rate says little. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 17(1), 1-2. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpag031

Vancouver

Unekbas S, Heiden B, Jenny F, Petit N, Bosco D. Invisible deterrence in merger policy: why the prohibition rate says little. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice. 2026;17(1):1-2. doi:10.1093/jeclap/lpag031

BibTeX
@article{Unekbas2026,
  author = {Unekbas, Selcukhan and Heiden, Bowman and Jenny, Frederic and Petit, Nicolas and Bosco, David},
  title = {Invisible deterrence in merger policy: why the prohibition rate says little},
  journal = {Journal of European Competition Law & Practice},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {17},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--2},
  doi = {10.1093/jeclap/lpag031}
}
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