Crossref
Invisible deterrence in merger policy: why the prohibition rate says little
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice · 03.07.2026 · 17 (1) · 1-2
DOI: 10.1093/jeclap/lpag031 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, online erschienen am 20.05.2026. Verfasst von Selcukhan Unekbas und 4 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kein Abstract verfügbar.
Zitieren
APA
Unekbas, S., Heiden, B., Jenny, F., Petit, N., & Bosco, D. (2026). Invisible deterrence in merger policy: why the prohibition rate says little. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 17(1), 1-2. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpag031
Vancouver
Unekbas S, Heiden B, Jenny F, Petit N, Bosco D. Invisible deterrence in merger policy: why the prohibition rate says little. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice. 2026;17(1):1-2. doi:10.1093/jeclap/lpag031
BibTeX
@article{Unekbas2026,
author = {Unekbas, Selcukhan and Heiden, Bowman and Jenny, Frederic and Petit, Nicolas and Bosco, David},
title = {Invisible deterrence in merger policy: why the prohibition rate says little},
journal = {Journal of European Competition Law & Practice},
year = {2026},
volume = {17},
number = {1},
pages = {1--2},
doi = {10.1093/jeclap/lpag031}
}
EUVIMED