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The genetical evolution of social preferences: where the categorical imperatives of Hamilton, Kant, and Nash meet

Laurent Lehmann iD

Journal of Evolutionary Biology · 2025

DOI: 10.1093/jeb/voaf120 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 2025. Verfasst von Laurent Lehmann. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Models, Genetic, Biological Evolution, Social Behavior, Choice Behavior. Die Arbeit nennt 66 Literaturangaben.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper models the genetical evolution of individual behaviour rules that guide the choice of strategies in pairwise assortative interactions under incomplete information. Building on results at the cross-roads of evolutionary theory and game theory, it is first shown that in an uninvadable population state of behaviour rule evolution, individuals are compelled to use strategies that are Nash equilibria of a lineage fitness game. Thus, choice behaviour evolves to be representable as the maximization of a utility function, as if each individual holds a personal rational preference. Second, the paper contrasts two representations of personal utility that are found to be uninvadable. The first is semi-Kantian in form. This preference averages a fitness self-interest with a Kantian interest, where the average involves the genetic relatedness between interacting individuals. The Kantian interest evaluates the consequence of own behaviour for own fitness, assuming the interaction partner adopts the same behaviour as self. The second preference is a personal inclusive fitness. This preference combines a self-regarding interest with a relatedness weighted other-regarding interest. Each of these interests takes the form of an average effect, which evaluates the consequence of expressing own behaviour, instead of average population behaviour, on a statistical average fitness to self and the interaction partner, respectively.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Models, GeneticBiological EvolutionSocial BehaviorChoice BehaviorGame TheoryGenetic FitnessAnimals

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Nash equilibriuminclusive fitnessinvasion fitnesslineage fitnesspreference evolutionsemi-Kantian preferences

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland.

ORCID-Profile: Laurent Lehmann

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APA

Lehmann, L. (2025). The genetical evolution of social preferences: where the categorical imperatives of Hamilton, Kant, and Nash meet. Journal of Evolutionary Biology. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeb/voaf120

Vancouver

Lehmann L. The genetical evolution of social preferences: where the categorical imperatives of Hamilton, Kant, and Nash meet. Journal of Evolutionary Biology. 2025. doi:10.1093/jeb/voaf120

BibTeX
@article{Lehmann2025,
  author = {Lehmann, Laurent},
  title = {The genetical evolution of social preferences: where the categorical imperatives of Hamilton, Kant, and Nash meet},
  journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Biology},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1093/jeb/voaf120}
}
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