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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Re-identification risk for common privacy preserving patient matching strategies when shared with de-identified demographics

Austin Eliazar, James Thomas Brown, Sara Cinamon, Murat Kantarcioglu iD, Bradley Malin

Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association · 01.02.2026 · 33 (2) · 336-346

DOI: 10.1093/jamia/ocaf183 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, online erschienen am 17.10.2025. Verfasst von Austin Eliazar und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: HealthVerity Inc., Philadelphia, PA 19103, United States. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Confidentiality, Medical Record Linkage, Computer Security, Data Anonymization. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 28 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: NHGRI NIH HHS, NIH HHS, NIH.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Objective

Privacy preserving record linkage (PPRL) refers to techniques used to identify which records refer to the same person across disparate datasets while safeguarding their identities. PPRL is increasingly relied upon to facilitate biomedical research. A common strategy encodes personally identifying information for comparison without disclosing underlying identifiers. As the scale of research datasets expands, it becomes crucial to reassess the privacy risks associated with these encodings. This paper highlights the potential re-identification risks of some of these encodings, demonstrating an attack that exploits encoding repetition across patients. Materials and Methods The attack leverages repeated PPRL encoding values combined with common demographics shared during PPRL in the clear (e.g., 3-digit ZIP code) to distinguish encodings from one another and ultimately link them to identities in a reference dataset. Using US Census statistics and voter registries, we empirically estimate encodings’ re-identification risk against such an attack, while varying multiple factors that influence the risk.

Results

Re-identification risk for PPRL encodings increases with population size, number of distinct encodings per patient, and amount of demographic information available. Commonly used encodings typically grow from <1% re-identification rate for datasets under one million individuals to 10%-20% for 250 million individuals. Discussion and Conclusion Re-identification risk often remains low in smaller populations, but increases significantly at the larger scales increasingly encountered today. These risks are common in many PPRL implementations, although, as our work shows, they are avoidable. Choosing better tokens or matching tokens through a third party without the underlying demographics effectively eliminates these risks.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

ConfidentialityMedical Record LinkageComputer SecurityData AnonymizationElectronic Health RecordsPersonally Identifiable InformationHumansUnited StatesDemography

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

electronic medical recordsprivacyrecord linkage

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • HealthVerity Inc., Philadelphia, PA 19103, United States.
  • Department of Computer Science, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061, United States.
  • Department of Biomedical Informatics, School of Medicine, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, TN 37235, United States.
  • Department of Biostatistics, School of Medicine, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Nashville, TN 37235, United States.
  • Department of Computer Science, School of Engineering, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, United States.

ORCID-Profile: Murat Kantarcioglu

Förderung

  • NHGRI NIH HHS
  • NIH HHS
  • NIH

Zitieren

APA

Eliazar, A., Brown, J. T., Cinamon, S., Kantarcioglu, M., & Malin, B. (2026). Re-identification risk for common privacy preserving patient matching strategies when shared with de-identified demographics. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 33(2), 336-346. https://doi.org/10.1093/jamia/ocaf183

Vancouver

Eliazar A, Brown JT, Cinamon S, Kantarcioglu M, Malin B. Re-identification risk for common privacy preserving patient matching strategies when shared with de-identified demographics. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association. 2026;33(2):336-346. doi:10.1093/jamia/ocaf183

BibTeX
@article{Eliazar2026,
  author = {Eliazar, Austin and Brown, James Thomas and Cinamon, Sara and Kantarcioglu, Murat and Malin, Bradley},
  title = {Re-identification risk for common privacy preserving patient matching strategies when shared with de-identified demographics},
  journal = {Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {33},
  number = {2},
  pages = {336--346},
  doi = {10.1093/jamia/ocaf183}
}
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