Platform and infrastructure competition after Android Auto
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement · 02.07.2026
DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnag007 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, online erschienen am 02.07.2026. Verfasst von Konstantinos Stylianou. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
On 25 February 2025, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the Android Auto case, remaking the core doctrine around how dominant undertakings relate to their competitors and the extent to which they have an obligation to assist them, namely the refusal to deal doctrine. Despite the good intention to update a notoriously strict doctrine for the digital economy (if not more broadly), the Court may have moved too far too fast. This article critically assesses the new refusal to deal doctrine, its relationship with past caselaw, its tension with platform literature, and its interaction with the Digital Markets Act, with which it overlaps. Crucially, it also proposes simple ways by which the new test could have been better calibrated while at the same time still allowing the Court to achieve its objectives.
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APA
Stylianou, K. (2026). Platform and infrastructure competition after Android Auto. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement. https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnag007
Vancouver
Stylianou K. Platform and infrastructure competition after Android Auto. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement. 2026. doi:10.1093/jaenfo/jnag007
BibTeX
@article{Stylianou2026,
author = {Stylianou, Konstantinos},
title = {Platform and infrastructure competition after Android Auto},
journal = {Journal of Antitrust Enforcement},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/jaenfo/jnag007}
}
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