Considerations of monopsony in merger analysis: The Penguin Random House case
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement · 01.07.2025 · 13 (2) · 444-457
DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnae041 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, online erschienen am 08.08.2024. Verfasst von Brianna L Alderman und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In 2020, Bertelsmann SE & Co., the owner of Penguin Random House (PRH), offered to acquire Simon & Schuster for $2.175 billion. If the merger had been consummated, the newly merged firm would have had a 49 per cent share of the market for publishing rights to anticipated top-selling books. Concerned by the proposed merger, the Department of Justice alleged that a more concentrated sector for publishing would result in lower advances to authors of highly anticipated books. The antitrust concern, therefore, centred on the exercise of monopsony power rather than monopoly power. The District Court was persuaded by the evidence presented at trial and blocked the merger on that ground. Having lost at trial, PRH decided to forgo an appeal. This article provides a brief analysis and critique of the District Court’s ruling.
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APA
Alderman, B. L., & Blair, R. D. (2025). Considerations of monopsony in merger analysis: The Penguin Random House case. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 13(2), 444-457. https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnae041
Vancouver
Alderman BL, Blair RD. Considerations of monopsony in merger analysis: The Penguin Random House case. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement. 2025;13(2):444-457. doi:10.1093/jaenfo/jnae041
BibTeX
@article{Alderman2025,
author = {Alderman, Brianna L and Blair, Roger D},
title = {Considerations of monopsony in merger analysis: The Penguin Random House case},
journal = {Journal of Antitrust Enforcement},
year = {2025},
volume = {13},
number = {2},
pages = {444--457},
doi = {10.1093/jaenfo/jnae041}
}
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