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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Playing Hard to Get: Strategic Signaling in Aid Bargaining

Anthony Luongo

International Studies Quarterly · 11.06.2026 · 70 (3)

DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqag065 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Studies Quarterly, online erschienen am 20.08.2026. Verfasst von Anthony Luongo. Die Arbeit nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Foreign aid is a political exchange between a donor and a target. Existing literature focuses primarily on the strategic actions of donors, but less is known about how targets advance their interests. This article explores the role of aid-receiving states as strategic actors who can extract concessions from donors. I model the aid exchange using a costly signaling model in which targets send a (potentially misleading) signal of their policy preferences before the donor makes an aid offer. In equilibrium, when the cost of sending a misleading signal is sufficiently low, targets who are aligned with a donor on policy sometimes lie about their alignment, which yields them aid that they would not have received otherwise. Empirically, I show that strategic nonresponse in the UN General Assembly—a low-cost signal of nonalignment—is correlated with higher future aid inflows.

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APA

Luongo, A. (2026). Playing Hard to Get: Strategic Signaling in Aid Bargaining. International Studies Quarterly, 70(3). https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqag065

Vancouver

Luongo A. Playing Hard to Get: Strategic Signaling in Aid Bargaining. International Studies Quarterly. 2026;70(3). doi:10.1093/isq/sqag065

BibTeX
@article{Luongo2026,
  author = {Luongo, Anthony},
  title = {Playing Hard to Get: Strategic Signaling in Aid Bargaining},
  journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {70},
  number = {3},
  doi = {10.1093/isq/sqag065}
}
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