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Moral Hazard in the Global Financial Safety Net: Evidence from Bilateral Swap Agreements

Qi Liu, Xun Pang

International Studies Quarterly · 11.06.2026 · 70 (3)

DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqag050 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Studies Quarterly, online erschienen am 06.07.2026. Verfasst von Qi Liu und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: American Political Science Association.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Globalization has intensified the cross-border transmission of financial risk, placing the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) at the core of international economic stability. Since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) have expanded rapidly, now exceeding International Monetary Fund (IMF) resources and fundamentally reshaping the architecture of global financial co-operation. While observers frequently warn that BSAs may induce moral hazard, systematic theoretical and empirical assessments remain scarce. We develop a network-based argument of moral hazard, arguing that states’ incentives to safeguard depend on their positions within the BSA network. We test theoretical expectations with an original dataset of global BSAs and causal inference techniques. The findings uncover a dual dynamic: central creditor states adopt more prudent positions, expanding their liquidity provision capacity by nearly 20 percentage points to reinforce network stability, whereas peripheral debtor states exhibit significant moral hazard, reducing their self-insurance by roughly 8 percentage points. This study shows that BSAs both diffuse the burden of liquidity provision and reallocate financial risk. In doing so, they generate new systemic vulnerabilities, shift the key currency system away from unilateral reliance on the United States toward burden-sharing among core central banks, and raise emerging challenges for domestic accountability in global financial governance.

Förderung

  • American Political Science Association

Zitieren

APA

Liu, Q., & Pang, X. (2026). Moral Hazard in the Global Financial Safety Net: Evidence from Bilateral Swap Agreements. International Studies Quarterly, 70(3). https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqag050

Vancouver

Liu Q, Pang X. Moral Hazard in the Global Financial Safety Net: Evidence from Bilateral Swap Agreements. International Studies Quarterly. 2026;70(3). doi:10.1093/isq/sqag050

BibTeX
@article{Liu2026,
  author = {Liu, Qi and Pang, Xun},
  title = {Moral Hazard in the Global Financial Safety Net: Evidence from Bilateral Swap Agreements},
  journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {70},
  number = {3},
  doi = {10.1093/isq/sqag050}
}
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